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Abstract
The Motor Insurers’ Bureau (mib) was formed in 1946 to provide compensation for 
victims of road traffic accidents from uninsured drivers and later untraced drivers.1 
The mib and its agreements have been criticised by academics due to potential gaps in 
coverage.2 The mib agreements are seen as ‘an entirely novel piece of extra-statutory 
machinery’,3 due to not being based in statute and therefore without parliamentary 
control. This has brought challenges involving issues of transparency when new agree-
ments are created. Claims against the mib, particularly in relation to untraced drivers, 
have also been controversial. With the UK in a transition period in terms of its relation-
ship with the EU and with the potential absence of a cause of action against the mib 
post-transition period, the question arises as to whether the mib should be put on a 
statutory footing.
This article therefore aims to explore whether the mib should be put on a statutory 
footing. It will examine the relationships between the mib, its members, the state, and 
Parliament. It will further examine issues involving transparency and enforcement. It 
will go on to compare the Australian Capital Territory (act) approach in legislation 
with the United Kingdom (UK) approach, to see what will be gained or lost with the 
1 Motor Insurers Bureau, ‘Untraced Drivers Agreement’ (2017) <https://www.mib.org.uk/ 
media/355104/amended-2017-untraced-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-and-wales_v10 
.pdf> accessed 21st February 2019.
2 See for example James Marson and Katy Ferris, ‘The Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2015 as a 
Legitimate Source of Authority’ (2017) 38 (2) Statute Law Review, Pages 133–146, 146.
3 Halsbury’s Laws of England see 709. ‘Loopholes in third parties’ statutory rights’.
* The author would like to thank Professor Rob Merkin QC, Professor Anne Barlow and Profes-
sor Andrea Lista for their comments and advice on this work. Any errors are the author’s 
own.
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UK adopting the legislative route. It will then conclude on which, if any, examine 
 potential reform options – radical or otherwise – might be usefully pursued to meet 
the criticisms of to the system in the UK.
Keywords
Motor Insurers’ Bureau – motor insurance – Australian Capital Territory – EU Law and 
nominal defendant
1 Introduction
A claim against the mib is seen as the last resort for the victims of road traffic 
accidents, who have no other route to compensation due to the driver of a ve-
hicle being uninsured or untraced. The mib has been compensating victims of 
these drivers since 1946. The Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 20154 (‘uda 2015’) 
and Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 2017 (‘UtDA 2017’)5 are not based within stat-
ute, but rather agreements between the mib and the UK Secretary of State for 
Transport (SoSFT). The mib plays other significant roles in the UK. For exam-
ple, by managing the motor insurance database and is also the UK’s represen-
tative on the Council of Bureaux.6 However, despite its successes, it will be ar-
gued here that there look to be good reasons now to take a different approach. 
In particular, given the added complications that Brexit poses in this field, 
has the moment come to countenance a radical overhaul of this area of regula-
tion both to ensure greater transparency and to put the mib on a statutory 
footing?
Controversy surrounds the mib agreements involving claims.7 It seems that 
this is the result of EU motor insurance law, which regulates, inter alia, the 
compensation paid to victims of uninsured and untraced drivers across the 
EU, providing a high level of protection for victims. Cases such as Bernaldez8 
4 Motor Insurers’ Bureau, ‘Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement’ (2015) <https://www.mib.org.uk/
media/166917/2015-uninsured-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-wales.pdf> accessed 03 
April 2020.
5 Motor Insurers’ Bureau, ‘Untraced Drivers’ Agreement’ (2017) <https://www.mib.org.uk/ 
media/355104/amended-2017-untraced-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-and-wales_v10 
.pdf> accessed 21 February 2019. When referred to together, the UtDA and uda will be re-
ferred to as ‘the agreements’.
6 See Council of Bureaux <https://www.cobx.org/> accessed 28 August 2019.
7 See for example the discussion from James Marson and Katy Ferris (n 2) 146.
8 C-129/94 Ruiz Bernáldez, Criminal proceedings against [1996] All ER (EC) 741.
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and Candolin9 from the EU courts have increased the protection provided by 
EU law for third party victims, and the mib agreements have been the subject 
of a number of disputes regarding compliance with EU law. For example, in 
Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport,10 the SoSFT was successfully sued 
in a Francovich11 action for the 1999 Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement’s12 (clause 
6 (1) (e) (iii)) breach of EU law relating to the compensation provided to those 
who commit an illegal act.13 With the UK officially having left the EU, and the 
future arrangements for after the transition-period finishes having not yet 
been agreed, this cause of action against the Secretary of State for Transport 
(SoSFT) could come to an end.14 This would leave a crucial gap. The  introduction 
9 C-537/03 Candolin and others v Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtio Pohjola and another [2005] All 
ER (D) 375.
10 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2015] 3 All ER 329.
11 C-6/90 Francovich v Italian Republic [1991] E.C.R. I-5357.
12 Motor Insurers’ Bureau, ‘Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement’ (1999) <https://www.mib.org.uk/
media/166947/1999-uninsured-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-wales.pdf> accessed 
02 March 2020.
13 The crime exception was introduced in clause 6 (1) (e) (iii) of the Motor Insurers’ Bureau, 
‘Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement’ (1999) <https://www.mib.org.uk/media/166947/1999- 
uninsured-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-wales.pdf.> accessed 02 March 2020.
14 The ‘Withdrawal Agreement’ currently governs the UK and EU’s relationship. The UK will 
continue to apply EU law until the end of the transition period (31st December 2020). See 
article 4 (1) of the Withdrawal Agreement which notes, ‘The provisions of this Agreement 
and the provisions of Union law made applicable by this Agreement shall produce in respect 
of and in the United Kingdom the same legal effects as those which they produce within the 
Union and its Member States. Accordingly, legal or natural persons shall in particular be 
able to rely directly on the provisions contained or referred to in this Agreement which 
meet  the conditions for direct effect under Union law’. Article 127 (1) of the Withdraw-
al Agreement, amongst a number of other things, notes, ‘Unless otherwise provided in this 
 Agreement, Union law shall be applicable to and in the United Kingdom during the transi-
tion period’. Under article 86 (1) of the Withdrawal Agreement, the Court of Justice 
of  the  EU (cjeu) continues to have ‘jurisdiction in any proceedings brought by or 
against the United Kingdom before the end of the transition period’. See also article 87 of 
the Withdrawal Agreement surrounding new cases. HM Government, ‘Agreement on the 
 withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the Euro-
pean Union and the European Atomic Energy Community’ (October 2019) <https:// 
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/840655/Agreement_on_the_withdrawal_of_the_United_Kingdom_of_Great_
Britain_and_ Northern_Ireland_from_the_European_Union_and_the_European_Atomic_
Energy_Community.pdf> accessed 02 March 2020. The UK could obtain an extension for 
up to two years after the transition-period (article 132 of the Withdrawal Agreement), al-
though this is unlikely. Section 33 of the UK’s European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 
2019 which inserted Section 15A into the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2018 
states that ‘A Minister of the Crown may not agree in the Joint Committee to an extension of 
the implementation period’. Also see Section 7 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.
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of legislation, whilst not remedying this completely, could enable an addition-
al claim against the mib in the courts. This would signify the equivalence of 
victims of uninsured and untraced drivers with those who are injured by an 
insured vehicle.
The mib has, particularly over the past two decades, faced calls from schol-
ars to reform its agreements.15 This is both in terms of the substance of the 
agreements, and concerning EU law compliance. This article focusses on 
whether the mib should be given statutory force, rather than just the substance 
of the agreements. Moreover, this article starts with the premise that the mib 
should not be removed altogether due to its critical role in the Council of 
 Bureaux and maintenance of the Motor Insurance Database. Any counter- 
arguments are not the focus of this article. In drawing its conclusions, an im-
portant comparison will be made between the UK and the act, to examine the 
potential effectiveness of suggested reform based on the act approach. It is 
hoped that this analysis will provide a unique and timely insight into these 
important issues, which have been long neglected from a UK perspective. In so 
doing, it will draw attention to the need to focus on the shortcomings of the 
non-statutory scheme in the UK, which has received little legislative scrutiny 
or evaluation.
This article will therefore examine some of the key challenges relating to the 
mib, and challenges which would be faced by putting it on a statutory footing. 
It will begin by examining the background of the mib, as well as its current 
status, providing an interesting indication in terms of the challenges the mib 
has faced. It will further discuss the relationship between the mib and its 
members, as well as the State, and Parliament. This will indicate potential in-
fluences on the mib’s agreements and challenges which could be faced by 
changing these influences post-transition outside of the EU. The second part 
of the article will examine the act approach and whether this would work well 
in the UK, an exercise never before undertaken. As noted above, whether the 
mib should be replaced is not discussed here, but rather whether its responsi-
bilities should be embedded in statute. Finally, the article will conclude by 
weighing up the potential benefits of statutory reform against the difficulties 
of such a new approach and consider the possibilities of reform.
15 Nicholas Bevan has written articles critical of the mib, for example Nicholas Bevan, ‘No 
through road’, New Law Journal 165 (7648) (2015) 7, and Nicholas Bevan, ‘A call for (more) 
reform’ New Law Journal 165 (7661) (2015) 9. Also see James Marson and Katy Ferris (n 3). 
Also see James Marson and Katy Ferris, ‘Motor vehicle insurance law: ignoring the lessons 
from King Rex’, Business Law Review 38 (5) (2017) 177–186.
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2 Background: The Formation and Development of the mib
It is important to first examine the formation and development of the mib, 
which will highlight that the compensation of uninsured and untraced drivers 
has always been complex and controversial. The mib was formed in June 1946. 
Prior to this, where the responsible party of a road accident was uninsured or 
untraced, the third party victim would be uncompensated, unless they found, 
and consequently sued, the uninsured driver for compensation. This was un-
doubtedly a significant issue for the victim. The introduction of the mib arose 
from a report of a Committee on the Board of Trade in 1937, led by Sir Felix 
Cassel. The Committee was composed of representatives from insurance com-
panies and Lloyds, to examine a number of issues with compulsory insurance, 
including in relation to uninsured drivers.16 In the Report, the Committee not-
ed that:
‘We are conscious of the fact that by so doing (setting up a central fund) 
we are providing for the road user injured by a motor vehicle a source of 
compensation which is not available to any other person suffering at the 
hands of a delinquent. Such a course, however, appears to us to be a natu-
ral consequence of the establishment of compulsory insurance, with its 
implication that every person injured by a motor vehicle should have the 
benefit of insurance’17
This highlights the unique nature of such a fund. Interestingly, the mib was 
formed nine years later with, ‘a threat of state control in the background ’.18 The 
mib undertook two agreements, the first, an Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 
with the Minister of War Transport, and the second, an agreement with indi-
vidual insurance companies (as well as insurance syndicates).19 In 1945, the 
Minister of War Transport noted that, ‘Legislation to give effect to the scheme pro-
posed by the (Cassel) Committee would be somewhat complicated, and I am glad 
to say that the insurers have made proposals for a voluntary scheme on similar 
16 As noted by Christopher Shawcross and Michael Lee, the Law of Motor Insurance (But-
terworth and Co, 1949), 362.
17 Board of Trade, ‘Report of the Committee on Compulsory Insurance’ (1937) cmd 5528, 
[164].
18 Professor Richard Lewis, ‘Insurers’ Agreements Not to Enforce Strict Legal Rights: Bar-
gaining with Government and in the Shadow of the Law’, (1985) 48 (3) Modern Law Re-
view (1985) 275, 280.
19 Shawcross and Lee (n 16).
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lines which I am satisfied will achieve the same purpose’.20 Interestingly the courts 
have later noted confusion surrounding the introduction of extra- statutory ar-
rangements compared to legislation. As noted by Lord Diplock in Gurtner v 
Circuit and another,21 ‘What reasons influenced the Government to adopt this 
oblique and extra-statutory way of imposing liability upon the bureau, despite 
the legal complications this involves, I do not know’.22 This is an interesting point. 
In both statutory and non-statutory uninsured vehicle arrangements, legal 
complications were present. However, it is not entirely evident as to what com-
plications concerning a statutory arrangement were foreseen. At the time, 
there would have been concerns surrounding how a statutory arrangement 
would work in practice, i.e. protections required to compel insurers against 
their will. Nevertheless, Christopher Shawcross noted, ‘The insurers have by this 
bold gesture taken upon themselves a great burden, in that they have agreed to 
shoulder the financial responsibilities of errant motorists in the absence of satis-
faction by these wrongdoers’.23 Further, Shawcross stated that the mib agree-
ments went much further than the Cassel Committee proposals, by, ‘imposing 
liability on all insurers’ for all third party claims under the Road Traffic Acts’.24 
Overall, it is evident that the introduction of the mib significantly restricted 
the right of insurers to avoid liability to third parties (although they could re-
pudiate claims against the insured).
However, the mib were only required to compensate victims of uninsured 
drivers, any payment made to victims of untraced drivers was ex gratia. Inter-
estingly, the original Cassel Committee Report did not recommend that vic-
tims of untraced drivers should be compensated.25 Nevertheless, the mib stat-
ed in clause 6 of the original agreement that while they had no legal obligation 
to compensate the victims of untraced drivers, ‘where there is reasonable cer-
tainty that a motor vehicle was involved and that except for the fact that the 
20 Uninsured Motorists (Accidents, Compensation) HC Deb 12 November 1945, 1869W. Of 
course, it is worth noting here that due to the nature of the mib agreements there was not 
a requirement under them for the mib to compensate victims due to the fact that third 
parties were not part of the contract between DfT and mib (this will be discussed further 
later), ‘In practice, however, it was unthinkable that the mib would violate the Agreements, 
and if it had done so it is likely that the scheme – or some alternative – would have been put 
onto a statutory footing’. See Peter Cane and James Goudkamp, Atiyah’s Accident Compen-
sation and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 244.
21 [1968] 2 Q.B. 587.
22 Ibid, 603.
23 Shawcross and Lee (n 16), 279.
24 Ibid, 364.
25 Noting that, ‘the grant of a right against the Central Fund would be calculated to lead to 
such abuses as to render such a course totally unsuitable’. Cassel Committee (n 17) [168].
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 vehicle, owner or driver cannot be traced, a claim would lie, the Bureau will give 
sympathetic consideration to the making of an ex gratia payment to the victim, or 
his dependants’.26 There was, however, significant lobbying by Parliament for 
this to change, due to instances whereby victims were not receiving redress 
after being injured by an untraced driver.27 Eventually the UtDA was intro-
duced to provide redress to victims, although with limitations, such as in rela-
tion to property damage. Nevertheless, the complexity surrounding the intro-
duction of the mib was evident, including the form it should take and its remit. 
The above synopsis highlights that the introduction of the mib was not simple, 
and it took a significant degree of compromise and goodwill. The mib then 
enhanced coverage further to comprise victims of untraced drivers in response 
to significant pressure to do so. The coverage provided by the mib is therefore 
not static, and there are external influences in terms of coverage that is achiev-
able. This can lead us to the question of whether legislation is required to in-
crease protection, and this is a matter to which we return.
3 The mib and Relationship with Members, the Secretary of State for 
Transport and Parliament
This section will now examine the relationship between the mib, its members, 
the state, and Parliament. It will seek to explore any complexity in these rela-
tionships, and further whether the extra statutory approach taken is beneficial 
in these relationships.
3.1 Members
The mib is a company limited by guarantee registered in England and Wales. 
Insurers who wish to partake in motor insurance business in the UK must be a 
member of the mib and contribute to its funding.28 The contribution of mem-
bers is proportionate to their fee income from motor insurance business. This, 
therefore, means that the eventual cost of running the mib rests with all insur-
ance paying drivers through insurance premiums. Interestingly, the require-
ment for insurers to contribute to the mib is the sole part of the Road Traffic 
Act 1988 (rta 1988) which contains the mib.29 The agreements are between the 
26 Hansard HC Deb 05 March 1965 vol 707 cc1814-24 at 1816.
27 Hansard HC Deb 01 December 1965 vol 721 cc1419-21.
28 Without such membership or contribution, the motor insurer is no longer deemed an 
‘authorised insurer’ and will be unable to undertake motor insurance business in the UK 
(Section 145 (6) rta 1988).
29 Section 145 (5)-(6) rta 1988.
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SoSFT and the mib. An individual wishing to receive compensation must meet 
the terms of the mib agreements and must submit their claim to the mib. As 
members of the mib, insurers can vote at meetings, and can nominate indi-
viduals to be on the mib’s technical committee. This therefore highlights con-
trol from members.30
The mib’s relationship with its members is found in its Articles of Associa-
tion.31 An interesting aspect of the mib’s Articles of Association is article 75. 
This provides that where a claim is made against the mib and the driver has 
insurance (albeit invalid), the insurer will compensate the victim as an agent 
for the mib. Compensation will be made under the uda 2015, not the original 
insurance policy. UK legislation through the rta 1988 allows this by not remov-
ing potential restrictions on coverage. For example, Section 148 (2) rta 1988 
limits certain exclusion clauses, meaning that insurers can use exclusions oth-
er than those within Section 148 (2) rta 1988. While this seems reasonable, it is 
controversial, as under EU law the insurer should be compensating the third 
party, and this should be within the insurance policy and not the mib Agree-
ment. Cases from the cjeu such as Csonka32 have noted that compensation 
should only be provided under the compensation body arrangements ‘where 
no insurance policy exists’. UK case law, however, has not followed this.33 The 
benefit of an insurer using an exclusion clause is unclear, as they would likely 
be required to pay under article 75.34 Nevertheless, this highlights a complex 
relationship between insurers, the mib, and statute. Insurers being part of the 
mib’s governance provides positives by utilising the expertise of the insurance 
market. The potential limitation of such expertise if legislation was intro-
duced, could be problematic.35
It is also notable that where there is a dispute between motor insurers involv-
ing article 75, this is dealt with through arbitration, ‘Unless the Bureau and the 
Member agree an alternative method for dispute resolution’.36 There is also the 
30 Article 74 (2) Motor Insurers’ Bureau ‘Articles of Association’ <https://www.mib.org.uk/
media/462763/2019-mib-articles-of-association-030719.pdf> accessed 22 August 2019.
31 See Motor Insurers’ Bureau ‘Articles of Association’ <https://www.mib.org.uk/media/ 
462763/2019-mib-articles-of-association-030719.pdf> accessed 22 August 2019.
32 C-409/11 Csonka v Magyar Allam [2013] All ER (D) 243, [31].
33 See for example Sahin v (1) Havard (2) Riverstone Insurance (UK) Ltd [2016] ewca Civ 1202.
34 Although note that the uda 2015 clause 6 (1) does not allow subrogated claims, therefore 
use of an exclusion clause, could mean another insurer compensating and unable to sub-
rogate the claim (see for example Bristol Alliance Ltd Partnership v Williams [2012] ewca 
Civ 1267). Also for limitations of the mib agreements compared to claims under the insur-
ance policy see below.
35 Note that claims and arbitration will be discussed below.
36 mib Articles of Association (n 30), article 75 (5) (f).
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potential to appeal an arbitration ruling to a court.37 An example of this is in 
Haven Insurance Company Limited v eui Limited (t/a Elephant Insurance)38 
whereby the insurance company was deemed to be out of time in making a 
claim to the arbitrator, as article 75 was unclear on the notice to be given by an 
insurer. This again highlights a complexity with article 75 which can be the 
subject of dispute. Further, article 75 provides some flexibility for the mib’s 
ability to settle claims. For example, the mib can settle claims itself ‘if it ap-
pears to the Bureau to be expedient’.39 Both this and the mib’s provision for 
methods of dispute resolution between insurers are examples of some of the 
flexibility involved in the current regime. Any future legislation would need to 
consider any impact of the potential removal of flexibility on both the insur-
ance industry and the victim. In the latter example involving the mib’s ability 
to settle claims, the removal of this could mean further delays in compensating 
the victim. This is not to say that legislation would automatically remove such 
flexibility although it requires careful consideration.
Overall it is clear that the mib’s relationship with insurers is one of collabo-
ration. Members have voting rights and can attend meetings of the mib; they 
are also consulted with. As noted above, this article is not concerned with 
whether the mib should be scrapped, but rather whether the agreements 
should be put on a statutory footing. The insurance industry have knowledge 
and experience of, the insurance market. While this expertise would not neces-
sarily be removed through the introduction of legislation, maintaining such 
expertise is an important consideration in any future legislation.
3.2 State Control
As the agreements are between the mib and the SoSfT, there is undoubtedly 
government influence here. The mib is not self-regulating with the ability to 
determine whether and how it compensates victims. The relationship between 
the mib and the State has been discussed on a number of occasions, as vertical 
direct effect of Directives can only be used against the state or its emanation. 
The mib is a company limited by guarantee, and therefore questions concern 
whether it is an ‘emanation of the state’. One of the requirements of ‘emanation 
of the state’ is state control, although this need not be on the day to day running 
of the body.40 In Silverton v Goodall,41 the High Court noted that the mib was 
37 Although as will be discussed below, this is challenging.
38 Haven Insurance Company Limited v eui Limited (t/a Elephant Insurance) [2018] ewhc 
143 (Comm).
39 See mib Articles of Association (n 30) article 75 (4) (a) mib Articles of Association.
40 Griffin v South West Water Services [1995] irlr 15.
41 [1997] P.I.Q.R. P451.
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an emanation of the state, ‘having regard to the history of the formation of the 
mib, and of the making of the successive agreements between the Minister and 
the mib, without which no doubt further legislation would have been passed’.42 
This highlights that the agreements were made against a backdrop of potential 
legislation, which could be a factor in negotiations. Interestingly, in the joint 
appeals to the Court of Appeal in Mighell v Reading and another,43 Hobhouse 
LJ was of the view that the mib was not an emanation of the state, noting that, 
‘the Bureau was brought into existence by the insurance companies which were its 
original members. It provided a vehicle through which those independent insur-
ance companies could enter into private law agreements with the Secretary of 
State’.44 In Byrne v mib and Another,45 Flaux J held that the mib was not an 
emanation of the state and did not fulfil the state control function. His lord-
ship compared the mib to Griffin v South West Water,46 involving significant 
powers of control provided through statute to the state, whereas in the case of 
the mib, ‘there are no equivalent powers of control given to the Secretary of 
State’.47 Consequently, despite the State being able to legislate, there is cur-
rently no legislation. Later interpretation of EU law in Farrell v Whitty (No 2)48 
has found that the requirements of emanation of state are not compulsory, 
and ‘state control’ is not necessarily required. This case concerned the mib in 
Ireland, which the cjeu held was an emanation of the state due to its function 
and later case law in the UK has found that the UK’s mib is an emanation.49 
Nevertheless, the UK’s relationship with the EU at the time of writing is likely 
to change due to the UK’s imminent departure from the EU’s jurisdiction post-
transition. The impact of this will be discussed below in relation to the en-
forcement through EU law. It is clear overall that there is not a significant 
amount of control on the day to day running of the mib from the state. The 
42 Ibid, 463.
43 White v White; Evans v Motor Insurers Bureau; Mighell v Reading [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 1251. 
Moreover, In White v White and another [2001] ukhl/9. Lord Scott noted, obiter, that the 
mib was not an emanation of the state, without providing much detail on this.
44 Ibid, [72].
45 [2007] ewhc 1268 (QB).
46 Griffin v South West Water (n 40).
47 Ibid, [59].
48 Farrell v Whitty (no 2) [2018] Q.B. 1179.
49 The latter case of Lewis v mib [2019] ewca Civ 909 the UK has found that the mib is an 
emanation of the state based on the reasoning in Farrell. For commentary on Lewis see 
James Marson and Katy Ferris, ‘The compatibility of English law with the Motor Vehicle 
Insurance Directives: the courts giveth…but will Brexit taketh away?’ Law Quarterly Re-
view 136 (Jan) (2020) 35–40.
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mib contracts with the SoSFT, and this, therefore, ensures a degree of consent 
required from the mib in terms of how it is run.
3.3 Parliament
Parliament, and its current role is important due to this article’s focus on the 
potential introduction of legislation. It is notable that there have been a num-
ber of questions asked in Parliament concerning the mib and how it operates. 
For example, in 1990 the parliamentary under-secretary for Transport was 
asked:
(1) how many complaints he has received about the operation of the Mo-
tor Insurers Bureau for each of the last five years; and if he will make a 
statement; (2) if he will give his reasons for his decision to allow the Mo-
tor Insurers Bureau to be regulated by a voluntary agreement; (3) if he 
will make a statement about the operation of the Motor Insurers Bureau; 
(4) if he will review the voluntary agreement operated between his De-
partment and the Motor Insurers Bureau; and if he will make a state-
ment; (5) what representations he has received about the operation of 
the Motor Insurers Bureau.50
This is an implied criticism of the mib, particularly the voluntary nature of the 
agreements. The response from the under-secretary was, inter alia, that, ‘these 
arrangements have worked satisfactorily…I have no plans to review the agree-
ments’.51 There was no criticism from the under-secretary involving the volun-
tary nature of the agreements, representation received, nor the number of 
complaints received. This therefore highlights a challenge in terms of transpar-
ency. Information as to how complaints are dealt with should be available to 
highlight any issues and potential challenges which are being faced by victims 
and the mib. Transparency will be examined below in further detail.
Nevertheless, Parliament has at times put pressure on the government in 
terms of the mib’s remit, for example in relation to victims of untraced 
drivers,52 although this does not show significant control. However, it is worth 
noting the indirect role that legislation through Parliament has on the mib’s 
coverage. The mib covers situations involving an absence of compulsory insur-
ance, it does not cover situations where insurance is not compulsory. Hence, if 
legislation alters the compulsory insurance requirements within Section 145 
50 HC Deb 05 February 1990 vol 166 c513W.
51 Ibid.
52 See above.
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rta 1988, this would automatically alter the coverage of the agreements. An 
example can be found when the rta 1988 was amended by the Motor Vehicles 
(Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 2000 which extended the compulsory in-
surance requirements to ‘other public place’. This consequently highlights some 
control over the coverage of the agreements from Parliament.
Of course, Parliament could pass legislation expressly regulating the mib. 
However, the impact of this in terms of the current agreements is uncertain. 
For example, if Parliament chose to continue with the current mib agree-
ments, and add statutory provisions regulating the mib, this could introduce 
confusion and conflict for victims. Moreover, issues could surround the ab-
sence of consent from the insurance industry and the potential removal of 
flexibility and expertise. Nevertheless, transparency and enforcement could 
potentially be increased, which leads us to the next part of this article.
4 The mib Agreements, Transparency and Enforcement
As noted above, the agreements are an extra-statutory mechanism to provide 
compensation to victims. There are challenges surrounding this in terms of 
transparency and enforcement which we will now examine.
4.1 Transparency in the Introduction of New Agreements
With the absence of the need for agreements to go through Parliament to be-
come effective, parliamentary debates in Hansard are largely unavailable when 
discussing the purpose and interpretation of the agreements.53 When a case is 
brought before a court to determine the interpretation of the agreements, 
there is potential for the courts to rely on discussions between the mib and the 
Government. However, it appears on occasion that the courts have been criti-
cal of the lack of evidence surrounding the introduction of certain provisions. 
For example, in Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport,54 concerning state 
liability for an exclusion contained in the uda 1999,55 Jay J in the High Court 
noted that:
As regards the evidence, the judge said that there was a conspicuous pau-
city of it; there were no documents bearing on the decision to introduce 
the crime exception into the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement…The clause 
53 Whereas they are in relation to the construction of statute see Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593.
54 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] ewhc 1785 (QB).
55 Involving those who commit a criminal act. Clause 6 (1) (e) (iii) Uninsured Drivers Agree-
ment 1999.
Downloaded from Brill.com07/24/2020 10:47:41AM
via free access
Channon
<UN>
180
european journal of comparative law and governance 7 (2020) 168-200
was introduced for the first time into the 1999 version. The decision to 
introduce it was undocumented. There was a November 1996 letter refer-
ring to a draft of the revised agreement but throwing no light on the deci-
sion to add the clause.56
This highlights a challenge for the courts, with Hansard unlikely to assist judi-
cial interpretation. This is further problematic due to the limits of available 
communication between the SoSFT and the mib. A statutory regime could 
consequently ensure that there is greater transparency in the introduction of 
agreements, and make it easier for the courts. Moreover, it would importantly 
provide claimants and their legal advisors with important information in order 
to interpret the agreements. However it is notable that the mib provide ‘Notes 
for Guidance’ for both their uda 201557 and UtDA 2017,58 which are found 
on  their website. Conversely, these are not particularly lengthy, nor do they 
provide enough in terms of the intention behind the introduction of the 
provisions.
Moreover, mib agreements are not introduced without input. For example, 
in 2013, the Df T undertook a public consultation on the mib uda and UtDA, 
and noted that, ‘We recognise the valuable work that the mib has already done 
with Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (apil) and Motor Accident Solici-
tors  Society (mass) to discuss and resolve issues under the Uninsured Driv-
ers’  Agreement’.59 Consultation responses were also published by the Df T. 
When the uda 2015 was introduced, the DfT produced a ‘Final Consultation 
Outcome’,60 providing detailed discussion of some of the changes made to the 
uda 1999, and the rationale behind these. However, some of the additions to 
the agreement were not discussed in significant detail. For example, the intro-
duction of a terrorism exclusion into the agreement (clause 9) was discussed 
56 Delaney (n 54), [42].
57 Motor Insurers’ Bureau, ‘Notes for Guidance: Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement’ (2015) 
<https://www.mib.org.uk/media/352780/2015-uninsured-drivers-agreement-notes-for-
guidance-v2-0.pdf> accessed 2 September 2019.
58 Motor Insurers’ Bureau, ‘Notes for Guidance: Untraced Drivers’ Agreement’ (2017) 
<https://www.mib.org.uk/media/358739/untraced-notes-for-guidance-v10.pdf> accessed 
2 September 2019.
59 Department for Transport, ‘Statement of intent on the Consultation on the Review of the 
Uninsured and Untraced Drivers’ Agreements’ <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/439697/statement-of- 
intent.pdf> 28 August 2019.
60 Department for Transport, ‘Department for Transport Response to the consultation on 
the Review of the Uninsured and Untraced Drivers’ Agreements’ <https://assets.publish-
ing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/442476/
response-uninsured-drivers-agreement-pdfa-2a.pdf> accessed 02 September 2019.
Downloaded from Brill.com07/24/2020 10:47:41AM
via free access
 181The Nature of the Motor Insurers’ Bureau
<UN>
european journal of comparative law and governance 7 (2020) 168-200
only briefly in the response. Interestingly, the exclusion was later removed 
from the agreement by the Supplementary Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2017 
(clause 3).61 Consequently whilst some context was provided behind the new 
agreement, communication of intention could be improved. There are, of 
course, going to be private discussions with private agreements, although any 
significant change to the mib regime, it is submitted, could and should have 
further scrutiny. An agreement enshrined in legislation would have had such 
scrutiny, with a number of stages in the House of Commons and House of 
Lords, along with a Committee and Report stage. Interestingly, the Supplemen-
tary Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 2017 was not subject to public consulta-
tion. This was a less substantial agreement which amended or removed certain 
provisions of the uda 2015, (such as the terrorism exclusion) and there were no 
significant additions. Overall, therefore, the limits of transparency when the 
mib agreements are introduced is concerning and reform is needed, the meth-
od of potential reform will be discussed later.
4.2 Transparency in Claims and Arbitration
The mib claims process is not straightforward. There are a number of chal-
lenges which need to be addressed in this part, including transparency, limits 
of appeal, and the appointment of arbitrators. The introduction of legislation 
here may be beneficial, as will now be discussed.
There are differing claims processes for victims of uninsured and untraced 
drivers. In relation to uninsured drivers, victims can sue an uninsured driver in 
court for damages, the mib will then compensate for any unsatisfied judg-
ments. However, ‘In practice, most cases do not actually proceed to court. The 
mib prefers to reach an agreement to pay compensation without going to court’,62 
although with the need for driver consent.63 Under the UtDA 2017, as there is 
no identifiable claimant, claims are made directly to the mib.64 Clause 11 of the 
UtDA 2017 notes:
61 Motor Insurers’ Bureau, ‘Supplementary Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement’ (2017) <https://
www.mib.org.uk/media/350345/2017-supplementary-uninsured-drivers- agreement-
england-scotland-and-wales.pdf> accessed 03 April 2020. In Roadpeace, the High Court 
found that the terrorism exclusion had breached EU law.
62 Timothy Edmunds, ‘Uninsured Drivers and the Motor Insurers’ Bureau’ (17th Novem-
ber  2015) House of Commons Briefing Paper <https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ 
ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN01997#fullreport> accessed 2 September 2019.
63 Ibid, 8.
64 In 2019, the Supreme Court (SC) in Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd (Motor 
Insurers’ Bureau intervening) [2019] uksc 6 were asked to determine whether a victim 
could sue an unidentified driver in court. The SC, noted, inter alia, that: ‘In the first place, 
the Road Traffic Act scheme is expressly based on the principle that as a general rule there is 
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Subject to clauses 3 to 10, mib shall, by adopting the same method as a 
court in England, Wales or Scotland (as appropriate) would adopt, be 
obliged to make an award or interim payment only if it is satisfied, on the 
balance of probabilities, that the death, bodily injury or damage to prop-
erty was caused in circumstances such that the unidentified person 
would (had he been identified) have been liable to pay damages to the 
claimant.
This provides that the mib is responsible for determining the liability of the 
person who caused the accident, and damages which would have been payable 
if the person was identified. Moreover, under clause 11 (2), the mib is entitled 
to determine whether any damages are to be reduced due to the contributory 
negligence of the victim. Whilst this provides some insight into the workings 
of the mib, it is nevertheless challenging, due to the mib attempting to predict 
the court’s actions as if the vehicle had been identified. Further, the mib is a 
commercial organisation with members who are insurance companies, and 
therefore the potential for bias has been pleaded by claimants.65 The determi-
nation of liability and damage is also difficult, as one of the parties involved in 
the accident involving an untraced vehicle would not be present to provide 
details of the accident. Moreover, as was noted in Carswell v SoSFT an untraced 
driver claim, ‘demands a system different to a certain extent, because, by defini-
tion, the driver at fault cannot be identified and pursued through adversarial pro-
cedures’.66 This is an important point. The absence of a driver is a challenge, as 
there is no judgment obtained against the responsible driver.
It is worth noting that if the claimant is unsatisfied with how their claim is 
handled under the UtDA 2017, they can appeal to an arbitrator (this will be 
discussed below). Of course, there are some limits with the mib’s power to 
determine awards such as when the victim is a minor67 or lacks capacity under 
no direct liability on the insurer, except for its liability to meet a judgment against the motor-
ist once it has been obtained…The availability of compensation from the Bureau makes it 
unnecessary to suppose that some way must be found of making the insurer liable for the 
underlying wrong when his liability is limited by statute to satisfying judgments’ [22]. This 
therefore highlights that there is not an opportunity for a claim against an untraced driv-
er, instead the victim will need to comply with the rules of the mib UtDA 2017 claims 
process, therefore providing a differing approach to the uda.
65 See for example the claimant in Carswell v Secretary of State for Transport [2010] ewhc 
3230 (QB) which will be discussed below.
66 Ibid, [71].
67 See clause 14 (1) (a) of the UtDA in terms of the definition of a minor.
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the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The determination of the award’s fairness will be 
provided by an arbitrator.68
The legality under EU law of the mib’s process was discussed by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (cjeu) in Evans.69 The cjeu noted that the 
UtDA 200370 did not render it, ‘practically impossible or excessively difficult’ 71 to 
exercise the right to compensation. The court recognised the appeals process 
from an mib decision, and further that the agreement’s procedures provide the 
‘advantages of speed and economy of legal costs’.72 This is an interesting point 
and an advantage of using a private system that does not need court interven-
tion at first. If a statutory system mandated the court to determine the dam-
ages for untraced vehicles, legal costs could be increased as well as the time 
taken to compensate. The mib was criticised by the applicant in Carswell v 
SoSFT73 who noted that the scheme in the UtDA 2003 is ‘fatally flawed’ be-
cause, ‘the mib is not independent. As it comprises all motor insurers (who are 
companies run for profit), it is commercially interested in the outcome of any 
claim; and it is both investigator and the body liable to pay any award ’.74 This was 
rejected by the court, first because this is an inquisitorial system, and second, 
because a different system was needed due to the absence of a driver. The 
court further noted that just because the mib was a commercial organisation, 
68 Note that there were challenges in a Judicial Review in Regina (RoadPeace Ltd) v Secretary 
of State for Transport [2018] 1 W.L.R. 1293. First, because the 2003 agreement did not pro-
vide this, and therefore as the agreements do not act retrospectively, the absence of this 
pre-2017 was a breach of the EU law principle of equivalence. The High Court rejected this 
and inter alia noted, ‘This has been a long-standing process in respect of which there has 
been, so far as I am aware, no complaint by the European Commission; nor have I seen evi-
dence of real problems on the part of minor or protected claimants in obtaining satisfactory 
awards under the UtDA, which would not have been found in a cpr claim against an insured 
driver’ ([111]). The second complaint was because the provision does not provide equiva-
lent protection as under cpr (Civil Procedure Rules 1998/3132) Part 2.1 which provides the 
requirement of a litigant friend as well as the requirement that a barrister writes on the 
sufficiency of an award. This was again rejected due to the differences between the UtDA 
and the cpr, for example noting that ‘if one compares a claim in respect of an unidentified 
driver with a claim in respect of an identified, insured driver, which would be governed by the 
cpr, the differences are quite significant’, [110].
69 (C-63/01) Evans v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and The Regions [2004] 
R.T.R. 32.
70 Motor Insurers’ Bureau, ‘Untraced Drivers’ Agreement’ (2003) <https://www.mib.org.uk/
media/166886/2003-england-scotland-and-wales-untraced-drivers-agreement.pdf> 
accessed 21 February 2020.
71 Ibid, [54].
72 Ibid, [53].
73 Carswell (n 65).
74 Ibid, [27].
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this, ‘is not determinative’, and ‘whether a body is a proper body to carry out the 
relevant investigatory function will depend upon all of the circumstances’.75 
Moreover, the court stated that ‘safeguards’ were present such as through arbi-
tration, obtaining legal advice, and enforcing the mib’s obligation to investi-
gate.76 Arbitration is particularly important for this article as it has been the 
subject of controversy, with concerns surrounding the appointment of arbitra-
tors, as well as the ability to appeal the decision of an arbitrator. Under clause 
18, the SoSFT shall appoint an arbitrator from a panel of Queens Council.77 As 
noted by the mib,78 ‘These senior barristers will be appointed because they are 
considered to have the necessary experience and expertise to adjudicate upon the 
range of issues which might possibly arise under the Agreement’. Nevertheless, 
particular concerns surround the partiality of arbitrators. In Evans,79 the 
 Advocate-General (A-G) noted that:
one must, it seems, proceed, according to the submissions of the parties 
to the present proceedings, on the basis that the Queen’s Counsel featur-
ing on the lists described provide every guarantee as to their indepen-
dence. That notwithstanding, the question still arises as to whether, in 
view of their procedural situation and their proximity to the mib, they 
also provide the same guarantee as to their impartiality.80
75 Ibid, [72]. An interesting comparison between the mib and the Criminal Injuries Com-
pensation Authority (cica) was made by the claimant, with the mib representing 
 commercial interests, whereas cica investigates claims as an arm of government. How-
ever, the court noted the similarities between the two, with both cica and mib payments 
paid out of the public purse. The mib are paid for by motorists. The court noted [74] that, 
‘any increase in the levels of payout by the mib is more likely to affect premium rates than 
profitability’. This is an interesting point, although it is submitted is not conclusive in 
terms of the criticism of the mib by the claimant in Carswell. It is worth noting that the 
mib have previously stated concerns surrounding premium increases and a consequen-
tial increase in uninsured driving. Moreover, the court in Carswell noted that [74], ‘The 
extent to which the effects of payouts on the profitability of insurance companies would im-
pact on those involved in settling mib claims is therefore, at highest, very uncertain indeed’.
76 Carswell (n 65), [76].
77 It is important to note that the uda further provides arbitration under clause 17 in rela-
tion to two requirements contained within provisions of the uda and their reasonable-
ness. The first is in relation to the form of the claim and the information which is required 
be provided by the claimant to the mib (clause 12), and the second in gaining a judgment 
(if required by the mib) against the person who is liable for the accident (clause 14).
78 See Motor Insurers’ Bureau, ‘Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 2017: Notes for Guidance’ 
(2017) <https://www.mib.org.uk/media/358739/untraced-notes-for-guidance-v10.pdf> 
accessed 28 January 2020, page 21.
79 Evans (n 69).
80 Ibid, [AG97].
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The cjeu in Evans found that the arbitration procedure fulfils EU law, as the 
arbitrator is, ‘appointed under conditions which ensure that he is independent 
and that he makes his award after making his own assessment of the information 
in the file’.81 In Application for Permission Kennedy,82 the claimant sought Ju-
dicial Review on a number of grounds, one being the partiality of the arbitra-
tor. The claimant argued that the arbitrator had shown bias in making an order 
which the mib did not seek.83 This again was rejected as there was ‘no evidence 
of bias’ shown here.84 Further, the claimant contended that there was a breach 
of article 6.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (concerning a right 
to a fair trial), and therefore the award should be set aside due to the absence 
of independence and impartiality from the arbitrator. Again this was rejected 
by the High Court.
An additional concern from the A-G in Evans surrounded the absence of a 
public hearing and an opportunity for claimants to be involved in the negotia-
tions between the mib and arbitrators.85 The cjeu noted that in relation to 
arbitration that victims must be aware, ‘of any matter that might be used against 
them and have an opportunity to submit their comments thereon’.86 Further, it is 
notable that an arbitration can only be appealed on a point of law, rather than 
on the case facts. Clause 16 (2) (c) UtDA 2017 provides that the claimant or au-
thorised person will provide an undertaking that the claimant will abide by the 
arbitrator’s decision.87 In Harvey v Motor Insurers’ Bureau,88 the High Court 
rejected an appeal by the claimant, concerning the fact that the arbitrator 
found that there was no basis for any award (as there was no evidence of 
81 Ibid, [50].
82 [2001] ewhc Admin 851.
83 This was set off of damages with costs awarded to the defendant in a case in the county 
court.
84 Application for Permission Kennedy [2001] ewhc Admin 851, [20].
85 Ibid, [AG98], note that in [AG93] the AG stated, ‘Both parties — the mib and the person 
injured — can, it is true, set out their respective views in the knowledge of the other’s 
submissions’.
86 Ibid, [56].
87 See Clause 16 (4) mib UtDA 2017. This is also for the mib. Further, Section 69 (3) of the 
Arbitration Act 1996 provides: ‘leave to appeal shall be given only if the court is satisfied— 
(a)that the determination of the question will substantially affect the rights of one or more of 
the parties, (b)that the question is one which the tribunal was asked to determine, (c)that, on 
the basis of the findings of fact in the award— (i)the decision of the tribunal on the question 
is obviously wrong, or (ii)the question is one of general public importance and the decision of 
the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt, and (d)that, despite the agreement of the par-
ties to resolve the matter by arbitration, it is just and proper in all the circumstances for the 
court to determine the question’.
88 [2011] 12 wluk 752.
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 negligence). This was rejected because this case was concerned with a ques-
tion of fact rather than a question of law.89 Evidently from the above the mib’s 
process is one whereby appeals can be made, there is an arbitration process 
and errors of law can be challenged in the courts. The system seems to allow 
for speedier and more cost-effective resolution. Altering the process would 
need to be carefully considered in light of the positives and should not be done 
lightly.
However, more could be done to ensure transparency. The mib could publi-
cise further information concerning claims, such as the process involved, as 
well as the rationale behind their decisions. The mib could use the Financial 
Ombudsman Service (fos) as an example. The fos publicises its final deci-
sions relating to complaints made against organisations, and how it handles 
those complaints.90 This is mandated in Schedule 11 of the Financial Services 
Act 2012, which inserts the requirement into Section 230A of the Financial Ser-
vices and Markets Act 2000.91 The fos does not publicise the personal data of 
individuals who make complaints, nor does it publish any early-stage discus-
sion or settlement. Of course, there are differences here between fos and the 
mib process. The fos process concerns complaints against other companies, 
whereas the mib concerns claims to itself. However, it is submitted that the 
publication of the mib’s decisions would be beneficial. For example, publicis-
ing details of decisions could aide in refuting any discussions around bias.92 
Moreover, in its 2011 consultation paper (after the publication of the Financial 
89 See also Application for Permission Kennedy (n 82) [15], where the court noted that ‘you 
cannot appeal on the facts’.
90 This is on the fos website. See fos, ‘Ombudsman decisions’ <https://www.financial- 
ombudsman.org.uk/data-insight/ombudsman-decisions> accessed 31 January 2020.
91 Section 230A Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 states ‘“‘(1) The scheme operator must 
publish a report of any determination made under this Part. (2)But if the ombudsman who 
makes the determination informs the scheme operator that, in the ombudsman’s opinion, it 
is inappropriate to publish a report of that determination (or any part of it) the scheme op-
erator must not publish a report of that determination (or that part). (3)Unless the com-
plainant agrees, a report of a determination published by the scheme operator may not in-
clude the name of the complainant, or particulars which, in the opinion of the scheme 
operator, are likely to identify the complainant. (4)The scheme operator may charge a rea-
sonable fee for providing a person with a copy of a report’.
92 This can be highlighted in the report by Richard Lloyd in the ‘Independent Review of the 
Financial Ombudsman Service’ who stated, ‘the best safeguard against bias is its strong-
lyheld values about the need for fairness and impartiality, reinforced by transparency ( for 
example the publication of casework data and decisions)…’. See Richard Lloyd, ‘Report of 
the Independent Review of the Financial Ombudsman Service’ <https://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/files/17748/Richard-lloyd-independent-review-2018.pdf> accessed 31 
January 2020.
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Services Bill 2011 by Parliament), the fos noted that, ‘Interested parties will be 
able to make their own informed judgement about the quality and content of our 
work, the appropriate consistency of our decisions, and how we are exercising our 
jurisdiction. Informed criticism of our work will help the ombudsmen to maintain 
high standards and develop our practice’.93 This would therefore ensure ade-
quate transparency and external discussion surrounding claims handling from 
the mib. It is further important due to the potential loss of awareness post the 
Brexit transition-period, where the right of action is removed, with limited vis-
ibility in terms of the mib’s claims handling. This, in fact, would be a significant 
increase in visibility compared to the mib before Brexit, and may cause chal-
lenges such as an increase in cost, something that some responses to the fos’s 
consultation were concerned with.94
Moreover, the fos has also noted concerns around cherry picking parts of 
their decisions,95 and a difficult balance was clearly faced by the fos in terms 
of whether to publish the Ombudsman’s determination, or to publish case 
summaries. With the latter, the fos argued that it would provide significant 
additional administrative burden to summarise all decisions, with ‘potential 
delays in the process’.96 Although with the former, this ‘might be confusing to the 
third-party reader’.97 Overall, it is submitted that the publication of decisions 
by the mib would be a step forward for transparency. This could be mandated 
through legislation or through the mib’s own process. Of course, this would be 
a challenge for the mib in terms of cost and administrative burden, which 
needs to be weighed up with transparency. The mib should undertake a con-
sultation on the publication of decisions and which should involve the forms 
of such publication.98
4.3 Privity
Controversy has historically surrounded the enforcement of the mib agree-
ments by third parties who are not party to the agreements. Professor Lewis 
noted that, ‘The use of private agreements which to which members of the public 
93 See fos, ‘publishing ombudsman decisions: next steps’ (September 2011) <https://www 
.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/files/17772/publishing-decisions-sep11.pdf> accessed 
31 January 2020.
94 fos, ‘Publishing Ombudsman Decisions: Summary of Responses’ (January 2012) <https://
www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/files/17771/Publishing-decisions-summary-2012.pdf> 
accessed 16 February 2020, 11.
95 fos Next Steps (n 93), 8.
96 Ibid, 14.
97 Ibid.
98 As well as the issue surrounding confidentiality. This was discussed in the fos consulta-
tion ibid, 17.
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are not party can result…in the ignorance of rights that have been secured but 
also technical difficulties in seeking to rely upon them’.99 The latter, in terms of 
seeking to rely on the agreements, is seemingly partially based on the issue 
of privity. As was noted in Albert v Motor Insurers’ Bureau,100 ‘The appellant is 
not a party to that agreement. Breach of it by the bureau does not under English 
law give her any right of action. A number of cases have been brought against the 
bureau by persons in a similar position to hers but the bureau has never, and says 
it never will, take the point that such a plaintiff has no cause of action’.101 This was 
reiterated by a number of courts since.102 In Evans, the A-G was critical of the 
fact that the injured victim was not a party to the Agreement.103 It is notable 
however, that under Section 1 (1) of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties Act) 
2000, an individual can sue under a contract, if, ‘the term purports to confer a 
benefit on him’. The mib UtDA 2017 expressly recognises the rights of third par-
ties to claim under the agreement in clause 25 (4). This is a recognition of the 
fact that the UtDA provides such benefit that the mib will compensate. In fact 
in Carswell v Secretary of State for Transport,104 the court held that such a 
clause (which was also in the previous 2003 Agreement) ensured that this pro-
vision was fulfilled. It seems therefore that the issue surrounding privity is not 
one of practical significance for third parties as things currently stand, and 
there is not a legal hurdle here to surmount.
4.4 EU Law
EU law is important to examine, due to the potential change involving the UK 
leaving the EU’s jurisdiction. It is worth repeating that the UK is subject to EU 
law until the end of the Brexit transition formatting here is off slightly – period 
at the beginning of 2021. The EU heavily regulates uninsured and untraced ve-
hicles in its Sixth Consolidated Directive,105 providing a high level of coverage 
99 Richard Lewis (n 18), 281.
100 Albert v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [1971] 2 All ER 1345.
101 Ibid, 1354.
102 Persson v London Country Buses and another [1974] 1 All ER 1251, 1253.
103 Evans (n 69), [AG131], ‘True, the mib does not appear to refuse compensation despite the 
absence of any contractual relationship in law with the injured person in view of the fact that 
it is obligated to provide compensation on foot of the Agreement with the Secretary of State 
for Transport. However, should the injured person consider that he is adversely affected, he 
must, if necessary, institute judicial proceedings against the Secretary of State to force the 
latter to insist on compliance with the Agreement’.
104 Carswell v Secretary of State for Transport [2010] ewhc 3230 (QB).
105 Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 
2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and 
the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability.
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in article 10 required from the compensation body. When challenging any po-
tential limitations of national law, there are a number of mechanisms that can 
be used. First to read national law in light of EU Law,106 second, to provide 
vertical direct effect of EU law against the state or its emanation,107 or third, if 
the member state fails to comply with EU, sue the state for breach (as hap-
pened in Delaney).108 This, however, is not an all-encompassing remedy, as su-
ing the State requires, inter alia, a ‘sufficiently serious breach’ of EU law.109 
Moreover, reading the agreements in light of EU law has been problematic. As 
noted by Lord Nichols in White v White, a case involving the term ‘ought to 
have known’ in the uda 1999,110 ‘Had the mib agreement been embodied in legis-
lation, whether primary or secondary, the English court would have been under 
an obligation to interpret its provisions, as far as possible, in a way which gives 
effect to the directive’.111 As the mib agreement was not contained within legisla-
tion, a Marleasing interpretation could not be used. Nevertheless, the court 
arrived at the same result based on conventional interpretation.
Evidently, the mib has not provided the coverage required by EU law, and on 
occasion, has fallen short of the requirements. For example, in Delaney the 
SoSFT was sued successfully for Francovich damages for breach of EU law due 
to an exclusion contained in the uda 1999 in relation to injuries caused ‘in 
course or furtherance of a crime’. (Clause 6 (1) (e) (iii)) The mib later removed 
the exclusion from its agreement. This therefore shows that such a cause of 
action can be beneficial in providing increased protection for victims. Without 
such a cause of action, the victim would not have received damages from the 
mib in Delaney (and potential future cases involving claims committed ‘in 
course or furtherance of a crime’). Of course it is worth briefly noting here (this 
will be discussed in further detail below) that differences for victims have ex-
isted, and continue to exist, with the UK under the jurisdiction of EU law. In 
106 Marleasing interpretation see Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimenta-
cion SA: C-106/89 (1990) C-106/89, ecli.
107 See C-41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ecr 1337. Note directives do not have horizon-
tal direct effect (see C-152/84 Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area 
Health Authority (Teaching) [1986] ecr 723).
108 C-6/90 Francovich v Italian Republic [1991] E.C.R. I-5357 and Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Fed-
eral Republic of Germany [1996] 10 wluk 405.
109 See Ibid (Francovich).
110 See clause 6 (1) of the mib uda 1999.
111 White v White, Evans v Motor Insurers’ Bureau and Mighell v Reading [2001] 2 All ER 43, 
[21]. Also see Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA Case 
C-106/89 [1990] ecr I-4135.
Downloaded from Brill.com07/24/2020 10:47:41AM
via free access
Channon
<UN>
190
european journal of comparative law and governance 7 (2020) 168-200
fact victims of untraced and uninsured drivers are currently treated less 
favourably.112
Nevertheless, EU Law remedies are only available whilst the UK is in the 
transition-period, or there is an agreement between the UK and EU encom-
passing this. The relationship between the EU and the UK beyond the transition- 
period is yet to be decided. If the UK is not required to follow EU law then a 
cause of action will not be present, meaning potentially less protection for 
 victims and less scrutiny of the mib agreements. Of course, it is worth not-
ing  here  that the introduction of legislation does not necessarily mean that 
the protection of victims will increase, nor is legislation required to increase the 
protection of victims. We will need to address the potential for introducing 
legislation in the UK, although it is first important to examine the act who 
regulate this area in legislation.
5 An example of Uninsured Driving Legislation: The Australian 
Capital Territory
This article has so far analysed the UK’s extra-statutory regime for the compen-
sation of victims of uninsured or untraced drivers through the mib. We will 
now examine a potential alternative approach through the Australian Capital 
Territory (act). The act approach provides that compensation relating to un-
insured or untraced drivers is contained in legislation (the Motor Accident In-
juries Act 2019 (maia 2019)), and hence is an interesting comparator to the UK’s 
approach. One significant difference is that the regulation of uninsured and 
untraced drivers in Australia is state specific, compared to Australia’s feder-
alised regulation of insurance law. This does not make a difference for the pur-
pose of this article, as there are a number of similar approaches to the act 
approach, by other territories in Australia. For example, the Queensland ap-
proach is also contained in legislation through the Motor Accident Insurance 
Act 1994. Of course, a difference between UK and Australia is that the UK is 
currently in a transition-agreement with the EU, and is subject to EU rules. 
However, there is nothing in the Sixth Consolidated Directive which prevents 
legislation for uninsured or untraced vehicles rather than extra-statutory 
agreements. Moreover, the UK has not, as of yet, entered into an arrangement 
with the EU post-transition period, meaning that from 2021 the UK could in-
stead follow an alternative approach such as act’s.
112 This will be discussed further below.
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In the act, compensation for victims of uninsured and untraced vehicles is 
made by the nominal defendant.113 The nominal defendant pays accident 
claims from the nominal defendant’s fund. (Section 329 (c) (ii) maia 2019 for 
‘uninsured motor vehicle’ and Section 329 (c) (iii) maia 2019 for ‘unidentified 
motor vehicle’). This is funded by insurance industry levies, as well as through 
recoveries such as in relation to costs from the responsible driver or person 
(Section 351 maia 2019). As the nominal defendant’s role is provided within 
statute, there is no requirement for a private agreement between itself and the 
government. Interestingly, the act nominal defendant covers three types of 
vehicle, uninsured vehicles, unidentified vehicles, and vehicles which have an 
unregistered vehicle permit.114 It is the first two of these which are important 
for the purpose of this study as the UK does not have the third. In relation to 
uninsured vehicles, Section 326 maia 2019 provides, inter alia, that:
(1)This section applies if—(a)a personal injury is caused by a motor ac-
cident; and(b)at the time of the motor accident, the motor vehicle in-
volved in the motor accident—(i)had a sufficient connection with the 
act; and(ii)was an uninsured motor vehicle; and(c)the motor accident 
happened anywhere in Australia…2)The nominal defendant is liable in 
relation to the personal injury as if—(a)an mai policy were in force for 
the motor vehicle; and(b)the nominal defendant were the mai insurer 
for the mai policy.
This therefore provides liability for the nominal defendant equivalent to an 
insured vehicle and puts the nominal defendant in the position of a vehicle’s 
insurer. Moreover, whereas in the UK a judgment would need to be obtained 
against the person responsible for an accident, act legislation does not pro-
vide that a judgment needs to be obtained against the person responsible. As 
noted under Section 236 (1) maia 2019:
If a motor accident claim is made against the nominal defendant, the 
nominal defendant may deal with the motor accident claim, and any pro-
ceeding relating to the motor accident claim, in the way the nominal de-
fendant considers appropriate including— (a) settling or compromising 
the motor accident claim; and (b) bringing and prosecuting a proceeding 
113 In the act, the nominal defendant is the Australian Capital Territory Insurance Authority, 
a statutory office rather than a private company.
114 For liability of the nominal defendant for Unregistered Vehicle Permit see Section 324 
maia 2019.
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under this Act for the motor accident claim and settling or compromising 
the proceeding.
Helpfully the maia 2019 further defines an ‘uninsured vehicle’, inter alia, as, ‘a 
motor vehicle for which there is no mai policy in force’ (Section 325 (1) (a)). This, 
therefore, provides some limited clarity in terms of what is an ‘uninsured ve-
hicle’, particularly with the fact that it includes ‘no mai policy in force’. More-
over, it is evident that the maia 2019 is restrictive of defences that insurers can 
use. For example, under Section 310, the insurer has ‘no power to cancel a mai 
policy’.
For untraced vehicles Section 328 maia 2019, inter alia states: (1) ‘if— (a) a 
personal injury is caused by a motor accident; and (b) the motor vehicle involved 
in the motor accident is an unidentified motor vehicle; and (c) the motor accident 
happened in the mai. (2) The nominal defendant is liable in relation to the per-
sonal injury as if— (a) a mai policy were in force for the motor vehicle; and (b) the 
nominal defendant were the mai insurer for the mai policy’. The maia 2019 fur-
ther provides a definition of ‘untraced vehicle’ within Section 327 (1) which, in-
ter alia, states that an unidentified vehicle, ‘(a) means a motor vehicle that can-
not be identified after reasonable inquiry and search’. Again this provides some 
limited clarity as to how an untraced vehicle is determined.
Section 263 (1), inter alia, states: ‘If a motor accident claim is made against the 
nominal defendant, the nominal defendant may deal with the motor accident 
claim, and any proceeding relating to the motor accident claim, in the way the 
nominal defendant considers appropriate including—(a) settling or compromis-
ing the motor accident claim’. This can therefore be likened to the mib in rela-
tion to untraced drivers. Nevertheless, a court proceeding can be brought later 
(in cases of uninsured vehicles against the nominal defendant and the person 
uninsured, (Section 272 (2) maia 2019) or in cases of unidentified vehicles, 
against the nominal defendant only (Section 272 (3) maia 2019)). However, a 
compulsory conference between the parties must occur before a claimant 
brings a case which may contain a mediator. This does not guarantee a settle-
ment although the each participant must ‘actively take part in an attempt to 
settle the motor accident claim’ (Section 262 (1) (b) maia 2019). Unlike the UK, 
there is not an arbitration hearing prior to court action for victims of untraced 
drivers, meaning that the claimant does not have the burden of proving an 
 error in law to be successful in court. Consequently, there is an additional lay-
er of transparency, as arbitration proceedings are not publicised. It is submit-
ted that this is an advantage, particularly for victims of unidentified drivers, 
compared to the UK. However, this could mean an issue for cost. Where a claim 
is settled at arbitration, it would evidently be cheaper than court action. 
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 Moreover, the use of courts may be a challenge due to the time taken to deter-
mine the results of claims.
As noted previously in this article, a criticism of the mib was made in the 
UK case of Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport115 as there were ‘no docu-
ments’ for introduction of the crime exception, and since this is a private agree-
ment, parliamentary debates did not assist in the court’s interpretation. How-
ever, in the act case of Cook v Nominal Defendant,116 a debate in the act 
Parliament proved useful in determining the time limit provision within the 
Road Transport (Third Party Insurance) Act 2008 (rttpia 2008) which regulat-
ed this area before the maia 2019. The court noted the time limit provision had 
previously provided no flexibility, with the nominal defendant unable to waive 
the three-month time limit. Also, there were concerns in the Legislative As-
sembly about this bar,117 and it was proposed that on two occasions that this 
bar should be lifted.118 The court therefore noted that as the final rttpia 2008 
provided some flexibility without any exceptions, this was wider than what 
was proposed. This highlights that the use of legislative debate can be useful 
for the court in interpreting provisions.
Furthermore, in terms of transparency, the maia 2019 notably does not pro-
vide for arbitration concerning the determination of awards. Instead, the maia 
2019 provides that both unidentified and uninsured vehicles are to be treated 
as if they are insured for the purpose of claiming against the nominal defen-
dant. The same process would be followed as if the vehicle was insured, which 
includes mandatory conference calls (part 5.7.2 maia 2019), mandatory final 
offers (part 5.7.3 maia 2019) and potential court proceedings (part 5.7.4 maia 
2019). This provides the opportunity for court action, whilst providing an op-
portunity for settlement before the case goes to court. It is submitted that this 
is arguably more transparent than the UK approach, and is fairer due to the 
treatment of victims in the same way (with exceptions for time limit). How-
ever, if an issue was settled prior to court action, such as through the manda-
tory conference call, it is unlikely that this would be publicised, meaning lim-
ited transparency. Of course, the mib is also not required to publicise when it 
settles a claim.
115 Delaney (n 10).
116 [2015] actsc 278.
117 See the debates of the Legislative Assembly for the act, 20 August 2008 at 3300–3301 cited 
in Ibid, [21].
118 Such as where a police accident report was not filled within three months and where 
there was an incorrect file of a claim to the insurer with the wrong number plate and it 
turned out the vehicle was uninsured.
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It is important to note that the Motor Accident Injuries Commission (‘the 
maia Commission’) was introduced in the act through Section 22 maia 2019. 
The maia Commission has a number of functions (see Section 25 maia  
2019), with one of them contained in Section 25 (f) ‘to provide, or facilitate or 
regulate the provision of, information to the public about the motor accident inju-
ries insurance scheme, causes of motor vehicle accidents… and motor accident 
claims, and dispute resolution’. In Section 236 (2) maia 2019 the nominal defen-
dant must provide to the Motor Accident Injuries Commission, ‘the reports 
that the mai commission reasonably requires about anything done by the nomi-
nal defendant under this section’. Section 236 (1) was discussed above and pro-
vides, inter alia, that the nominal defendant ‘may deal with the motor accident 
claim’ (Section 236 (1)). Consequently, the requirement in Section 236 (2) pro-
vides an additional layer of transparency in the act. This could be considered 
in the UK, although, it is submitted, that the publishing of decisions by the mib 
such as the approach taken the fos (as discussed above) could provide needed 
transparency.
6 What Next?
This article has so far found that while the UK’s system for compensating vic-
tims of uninsured and untraced drivers is beneficial for cost implications and 
expertise, there are challenges surrounding transparency and the provision of 
adequate protection for third party victims, particularly post-transition period. 
The act approach provides an interesting contrast to the UK due to additional 
transparency. Although, whether this would work in the UK is uncertain. It is 
necessary, therefore, to examine whether a statutory system would be benefi-
cial, or whether there are alternatives. It is clear that the mib agreements do 
not currently provide complete protection for accident victims, despite the 
agreements being concerned with providing compensation. However, it is dif-
ficult to know whether claimants fall through the gaps in the agreements and 
the extent of this, which can linked to the absence of transparency surround-
ing claims. Moreover, notwithstanding limits for statutory coverage of victims 
of insured vehicles,119 the difference in treatment of accident victims is evi-
dent. For example, as noted by Steven Gee:
Victims can claim in arbitration against the mib under a scheme which 
in certain respects gives victims less than what can be available in court. 
119 See exclusion clauses within Section 148 (2) rta 1988.
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For example, subrogated claims are not permitted. Replacement car 
schemes which promptly provide a replacement vehicle to a victim work 
in insurance cases through the provider being subrogated to a claim for 
its charges, but in practice are not available to a victim who has to rely on 
a claim against the mib120
Further, in the uda 2015, there are ‘preconditions to the mib’s obligation’,121 
 including in relation to the form of claims,122 joining the mib as a defendant,123 
prosecution of proceedings,124 and assignment of judgments, settlements, 
and  undertakings.125 Moreover, the UtDA 2017 contains a number of proce-
dural requirements and time limits,126 and a limitation in terms of property 
damage.127
As noted previously, differences between the treatment of victims have 
been limited to a certain extent due to EU law. Consequently, the removal of a 
cause of action could mean that victims have less opportunity to challenge the 
agreements. However, it is also notable that the limitations and differences be-
tween the treatment of victims have been present with the UK under the juris-
diction of the EU. In fact, the High Court in Roadpeace denied a breach of EU 
law relating to a time limit clause in the previous UtDA 2003,128 noting that, ‘it 
is evident that there are differences in their circumstances (victims of insured, 
uninsured, and untraced vehicles)’.129 This means that an EU cause of action 
120 Steven Gee QC, ‘Suing persons unknown, the EC Motor Insurance Directive and Cameron 
v Liverpool Victoria’ (2019) 6 Journal of Business Law 416, 418–419. Also see McCall v Poul-
ton [2008] ewca Civ 1313, involving the denial of a subrogated claim by the mib for credit 
hire charges (under clause 6 (1) (c) of the 1999 uda) and (clause 17 (1) of the 1999 uda 
which allowed deductions by the mib for any claims paid by another insurer). Questions 
concerned whether the mib Agreement should be read in light of (article 1 (4)) of the 
Second Council Directive 84/5/eec of 30 December 1983 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles). This case was settled before it reached the European Court of Justice.
121 See the uda 2015 (n 4), p9.
122 Ibid, clause 12.
123 Ibid, clause 13.
124 Ibid, clause 14.
125 Ibid, clause 15.
126 See for example ‘obligations upon the claimant’ in clause 10 UtDA 2017 (n 5).
127 Ibid, clause 7.
128 Clause 4 (c) to (e) UtDA 2003 (n 70).
129 Roadpeace v Secretary of State for Transport v Motor Insurer’s Bureau [2017] ewhc 2725 
(Admin). The court referred to Evans v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions 2006] ewhc 322 (QB) (where the court had found a breach of EU law in 
terms of time limits). The High Court noted [119], ‘Evans does not suggest that there should 
be no differences between the provisions for insured and identified drivers and unidentified 
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did not always prevent differences in the treatment of victims.130 However, it 
has certainly provided the opportunity for victims to challenge the agreements 
in court due to breaches of EU law, with some success such as in Delaney and 
Evans. Consequently, with the potential removal of a cause of action post tran-
sition-period, it is arguable that the cause of action should be replaced to en-
sure that the agreements are kept under continued scrutiny and protection is 
increased.
Of course, there is nothing to prevent legislation from including exclusions. 
However, differences between the protection offered to victims of uninsured 
and insured vehicles would be more noticeable and would be open to more 
scrutiny. Moreover, introducing a system to compensate the victims of unin-
sured and untraced vehicles in legislation would provide some advantages. For 
example, through signifying the equivalence of accident victims from unin-
sured and untraced vehicles, with victims of insured vehicles, as shown in the 
act approach. However, it is questionable whether the equivalence of third 
parties could instead be signified in the mib agreements, without the need for 
statute. Greater transparency in discussions between the DfT and the mib, as 
well as greater consultation with those external to the mib and DfT could also 
signify equivalence without resorting to legislation. It is evident, as noted 
above, that the mib undertake consultation in relation to their agreements. 
However, further consultation would undoubtedly be welcome.
Moreover, it is questionable whether the introduction of a statutory mib 
(similar to the act approach) would fit well in the UK due to the need for co-
operation. The UK’s approach has been in place since 1946 with focus on 
co-operation between the insurance industry and government. The removal of 
agreements, and therefore forcing the mib to compensate through legislation, 
could mean an absence of goodwill from the insurance industry. This is not 
only with motor insurance but also other forms of insurance.131 Moreover, it 
could mean insurers attempting to find loopholes in any statutory scheme 
when a claim is made. This would also be a significant challenge, as after the 
transition-period there may not be direct effect of EU law to fill some of 
the gaps in a statutory scheme. Of course, it is difficult to know whether, with 
the removal of direct effect, insurers would attempt to find loopholes in the 
drivers.’ The court further noted that the principle of equivalence was not offended by 
differences, noting, [120], ‘Equivalence does not require that the provisions be identical; 
these are equally favourable for the differing circumstances to which they need to apply.’
130 The mib, for example has removed the ‘crime exception’, it has further removed a number 
of the time limits which were in place in 1999.
131 See for example Lewis’s (n 18) article which discusses some of the co-operation between 
the state and the insurance industry not to enforce legal rights.
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non-statutory agreements in the future anyway. However, it remains that the 
introduction of a statutory mib and the removal of co-operation requires care-
ful consideration, with the impact considered. Whilst the author recognises 
that the law should not be developed with only insurance interests in mind, 
and if a statutory scheme was necessary, this would undoubtedly override such 
interests, it is submitted that this is not evident here. The introduction of a new 
statutory mib, whilst providing some benefits in terms of transparency, is not 
necessary to provide increased protection to third parties. The DfT could push 
for greater protection without statutory intervention.132
Further, the insurance industry has significant expertise of claims process-
es, pricing, and risk, meaning that working with the insurance industry is im-
portant to ensure that significant disruption is not caused in the conduct of 
insurance business. Of course, any changes made through legislation would 
not necessarily mean that the insurance industry would not have a role and 
could not provide expertise, as was noted above. Moreover, the mib’s current 
challenges involving Brexit are substantial, and therefore the introduction of a 
statutory mechanism would provide less time to focus on this. Consequently, 
substantial reform to the mib through statute could be examined at a later 
date. The mib has been in place for a significant period of time, and whilst 
there have been some challenges, reform is probably not a high priority. As 
noted by Mr Justice McKay, ‘the mib has operated efficiently, successfully and to 
general approval for over 60 years. It has attracted added responsibilities, for ex-
ample, the 1969 Untraced Drivers’ Agreement. The risk that it would effectively 
disappear and not be replaced by some equivalent institutional body, in my judg-
ment, is so remote as to be capable of being discounted entirely for present pur-
poses’.133 This statement occurred pre-significant case law such as Delaney and 
Roadpeace, as well as Brexit (whereby a cause of action is removed). However, 
it is submitted that it is unlikely that this would have a significant effect in call-
ing for the mib to be put on a legislative footing. Changes could be made to the 
agreements without statute.
It is notable, however, that the introduction of a statutory mib may mean 
the removal of flexibility. The SoSFT and the mib can amend the agree-
ments with supplementary agreements, without the need to go through a po-
tentially long parliamentary process.134 A difficulty with this, however  concerns 
132 Also see the previous discussion around the compensation of victims from untraced driv-
ers and which was introduced by the mib.
133 Mr Anthony Nathaniel Bennett v Mr Leonard John Stephens [2010] ewhc 2194 (QB), [19].
134 See, for example, the mib uda Supplementary Agreement which, inter alia, removed 
the  terrorism exception and vehicle damage exception from the previous agreements, 
see mib ‘The Supplementary Agreement (uda)’ (2017) <https://www.mib.org.uk/media/ 
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exclusions and the absence of transparency.135 An approach that mixes the 
mib agreements with legislation could provide a solution to some of the chal-
lenges in the agreements, such as the main exclusions, which could be pro-
vided in statute. This would ensure some flexibility for the mib to determine its 
process and requirements, with greater transparency and oversight regard-
ing  important elements in legislation. However, this could cause confusion 
with regulation in two places, and further risking co-operation. An alterna-
tive approach could be to ensure that there is significant transparency going 
 forward when agreements are introduced through the publication of discus-
sions.  Moreover, increased collaboration with various organisations, and 
further consultation are also important. This, it is submitted, would be a less 
drastic approach than legislating, and would solve some of the issues sur-
rounding transparency, without risking the relationship between the mib and 
the government.
The act approach for claims is a potential alternative to the much-criticised 
UK approach.136 A particular issue, it seems, involves arbitration and the ap-
pointment of arbitrators. Consequently, the act approach, which provides the 
opportunity of court action, could be a solution. Whilst arguably proving cost-
ly and untimely if court action was more likely, the use of a compulsory confer-
ence mechanism to try and solve disputes before they go to court may indeed 
limit this. Again, the introduction of a different mechanism for claims would 
be a significant overhaul for the mib. This could mean the potential for higher 
costs, and therefore likely unpopularity with the insurance industry and mo-
torists, with the costs being passed on through insurance premiums. This arti-
cle has highlighted that despite concerns surrounding the mib’s approach to 
claims, particularly concerning untraced drivers, the courts have not found 
that this approach is illegal.
It is therefore submitted that while the current approach concerning claims 
is not entirely satisfactory, a radical overhaul would need to be carefully deter-
mined in light of the time taken and cost. It seems overall that the act ap-
proach, while an interesting alternative, should not be introduced lightly. 
There are several factors involved which would need to be considered, and it 
seems that some of the challenges highlighted in this article could be ad-
dressed through greater transparency in the way the mib operates. The mib 
should consider providing more transparency for claims overall, with more 
350345/2017-supplementary-uninsured-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-and-wales 
.pdf> accessed 03 April 2020.
135 Such as the crime exception as noted above.
136 As was noted above.
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 detail in terms of how claims are handled, any complaints received resulting 
from claim handling, and how the law is applied to claims that are received. 
The UK could take the fos as an example in providing the detail of claims. This 
would ensure greater transparency and scrutiny of the mib. However, the mib 
should consult on this in terms of the detail to be provided, and should further 
consider the potential cost and administrative burden. Legislation could also 
be introduced as there is currently with the fos.
7 Conclusion
The UK’s system of compensating victims for damages resulting from unin-
sured or untraced drivers is complex. The mib has been in place for over 70 
years and has been at the centre of various controversies. There has been criti-
cism of difficulties surrounding coverage, enforcement and transparency. One 
of the reasons behind this is undoubtedly the private nature of the mib. Trans-
parency is certainly a significant issue, the rationale behind the introduction 
of certain provisions is unclear. Moreover, the procedure for claims in terms of 
untraced drivers also lacks transparency, along with the requirement of arbi-
tration for appeals. Whilst the mib’s claims procedure has been criticised by 
some claimants, it seems that the procedure has some benefits around the cost 
and timeliness of proceedings.
Having examined the approach from the act as a potential alternative op-
tion for the UK, it is evident that the act approach provides greater transpar-
ency, and clarity in terms of how an uninsured vehicle is defined. The equiva-
lence of uninsured and untraced vehicles with insured vehicles could be 
welcomed in the UK, although it is questionable as to whether this would re-
quire legislation. Legislation in the UK, however, would be a significant change 
to what is, and has been in place for more than 70 years. Moreover, it is ques-
tionable whether there will be an appetite for such an approach once the UK 
leaves the EU post-transition, where the absence of case law challenging non-
compliance with EU law will reduce the pressure to reform. However, the ab-
sence of a direct right of action could increase the appetite for reform due to 
the absence of being able to challenge the agreements, and obtain a remedy 
against the state.
Overall, it is submitted, that a legislative approach in terms of the mib could 
and should be considered going forward to meet the longer-term need for re-
form. However, other options such as increasing transparency are a less radical 
but more immediate way of reform which could and should be discussed. The 
introduction of a statutory mib would require a significant and challenging 
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shift in emphasis from the UK. The probability of the further protective layer 
provided by EU law being removed has brought this very clearly into focus, 
highlighting the importance of such a discussion going forward to maintain 
the protection of third party victims.
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